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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, I will examine the notion of multi-level governance in the 
EU (MLG) as developed by the Committee of the Regions in the 2009 
White Paper on MLG. I will analyse MLG from a legal perspective to 
identify its legal basis. I will sketch out the nature of MLG as a proce-
dural principle in the EU legal system and will identify four functions of 
MLG: shaping the EU as a polity; shaping future developments in EU 
law; shaping the behaviour of political actors within the EU; shaping the 
interpretation of EU law by the CJEU. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This is a legal study of multi-level governance in the EU (MLG). MLG is 
defined by the Committee of the Regions in the 2009 White Paper on 
MLG as participation of regional and local authorities in EU decision-
making processes. Earlier legal studies investigated the nature of MLG 
as a legal principle, suggesting that MLG is a ‘procedural principle’ or a 
‘principle of coordination’ of the action of governmental actors at various 
levels within the EU. However, the legal bases of MLG still need to be 
persuasively identified in EU primary law and in the constitutional laws of 
the Member States; the nature of MLG as a legal principle in the context 
of the EU demands more compelling evidence; the normative content of 
MLG needs further definition; the practical legal consequences of MLG 
still need to be clearly determined, especially the application of MLG by 
Union and national judiciaries. 
This study will look at these aspects from a legal perspective. Only 
through a legal analysis, that is, through the interpretation of the legal 
bases of MLG, it is possible to address these questions and particularly 
to determine the legal nature and the legal consequences of MLG in the 
multi-layered legal system of the EU.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this article, I will examine the notion of multi-level governance in the EU 
(hereafter MLG). This notion, originally created by political scholars to un-
derstand and explain the functioning and particularly the decision-making 
processes of the EU, has later become a normative and, more recently, a 
legal concept. Whilst the normative notion of MLG has been persuasively 
sketched out by political scholars (Piattoni 2010 and Stephenson 2013), 
and more recently also by legal scholars (Vandenbruwaene 2014), MLG 
as a legal notion demands further analysis. 
At a very general level MLG indicates the dispersion of authoritative deci-
sion-making across multiple players at different territorial levels within the 
EU (Marks and Hooghe 2001: XI). More specifically, MLG in the context 
of the EU can be used in relation to different phenomena, albeit linked to 
one another. These include the following:  
(1) A federalism-like system in the EU or at national level with various 
tiers of government (European, national, regional, local): Type 1 
MLG (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 17-20; Piattoni 2010: 246-247). 
(2) Governance based on special-purpose agencies: Type 2 MLG 
(Marks and Hooghe 2001: 20-22). 
(3) Public-private partnerships in the context of the EU Regional Pol-
icy (Marks 1992: 191; Bache 2004: 165).   
(4) Negotiation of policy by private and public players on the national 
and EU level (Schmitter and Kim 2005: 5).   
Type 1 vision of MLG conceives dispersion of authority to jurisdictions or 
authorities at a number of territorial levels. These jurisdictions or authori-
ties – international, national, regional, meso, local – are ‘general-purpose’, 
in that they bundle together multiple functions, policy responsibilities, and 
in many instances, like in the EU, a court system and representative insti-
tutions (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 16-20; Hooghe and Marks 2010: 17-
20). Hooghe and Marks suggest that in this form of governance every cit-
izen is located in a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions, where in prin-
ciple there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular terri-
torial scale (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 16; Hooghe and Marks 2010: 17). 
These jurisdictions are intended to be, and usually are, stable over a rel-
atively long period of time (years or even decades), even though the allo-
cation of policy responsibilities across levels might be flexible. The arche-
type of Type 1 MLG is federalism, which is concerned with allocation and 
sharing of powers among territorial jurisdictions (cf. Hooghe and Marks 
2010: 18; Marks and Hooghe 2004: 17).  
Type 2 MLG is comprised of task-specific jurisdictions (‘agencies’) dealing 
with ad hoc issues, such as, transport, waste and recycling, water quality 
monitoring etc. In Type 2 MLG there are intersecting memberships in that 
the agencies operate within a territory which is not neatly contained within 
the borders of a larger jurisdiction and may therefore manage issues con-
cerning citizens belonging to different territorial communities and states. 
The number of agencies is potentially unlimited and flexible, as in theory 
there could be as many agencies as required by the various issues on the 
agenda and the agency system could be reviewed as appropriate at any 
point in time (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 20-22; Hooghe and Marks 2010: 
20-22). 
The EU is the most advanced and complex example of Type 1 MLG be-
yond the national state, even though Hooghe and Marks highlight that cer-
tain areas of EU governance reflect a Type 2 MLG approach; for example, 
the distinct governance systems or ‘pillars’ for different policies; the multi-
plication of independent European agencies; the enhanced cooperation 
in certain fields, such as, monetary policy and border controls (cf. Hooghe 
and Marks 2010: 23). 
The focus of this study is on the participation of regional and local author-
ities in EU decision-making processes (cf. Skoutaris 2012: 212; Panara 
2016b) in the context of Type 1 MLG. This choice finds its justification in 
the prominent role of Type 1 MLG in the context of the EU (Hooghe and 
Marks 2010: 23). It also finds justification in the widely shared suggestion, 
coming especially from legal scholars, that the EU is a sui generis and 
supranational federation which features many elements of a traditional 
federation (Schütze 2012: 77-79, even though he criticises the use of the 
adjective ‘sui generis’ in relation to the EU; von Bogdandy 2009: 32). Fi-
nally, it finds its justification in the prominence ascribed by important po-
litical documents of the EU, such as, the White Paper on European Gov-
ernance (2001) and the White Paper on MLG (2009), to concerns relating 
to Type 1 MLG. 
According to a different narrative of MLG proposed by Piattoni (2009 and 
2010: 26-31), there are three different but combined ‘axes’, i.e. three di-
mensions, of MLG. The first is ‘center v. periphery’, which indicates move-
ments away from the unitary state towards decentralized systems of gov-
ernance. The second is ‘domestic v. international’, which indicates move-
ments away from the national state towards increasingly structured modes 
of international cooperation and regulation, including the EU. The third is 
‘state v. society’, which portrays movements towards increasing involve-
ment of non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations in 
authoritative decision-making and policy implementation. 
This study, which focuses on sub-national participation in EU processes, 
operates along the axes ‘centre v. periphery’ (including Type 1 MLG) and 
‘domestic v. international’ (including the shift of powers from the Member 
States to the EU). The objective of this study is to look at MLG as a legal 
notion capable of reconciling these two movements into opposite direc-
tions – downwards towards decentralisation (axis 1) and upwards towards 
centralisation at EU level (axis 2), whilst the third dimension of MLG (‘state 
v. society’) is not part of my current analysis. 
Following the same path of earlier works (for example, Weatherill and Ber-
nitz 2005; Mangiameli 2006) and of EU primary law, this study will include 
both ‘local’ and ‘regional authorities’, i.e. the ‘sub-national’ level of govern-
ment within the EU. This approach should not be understood as a sug-
gestion that there is a homogenous and undifferentiated sub-national level 
of government across the EU (cf. Moore 2008: 524). This methodology is 
consistent with the EU primary law, which does not differentiate between 
the two types of sub-national authorities (the only exception to this lack of 
differentiation is Article 6(1) Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol, which envisages 
consultation with ‘regional parliaments with legislative powers’).  
The distinction between ‘local’ and ‘regional’ authorities is at times ambig-
uous also at national level. For example, all the French territorial commu-
nities share the same fundamental nature, irrespective of their level (‘re-
gions’, ‘departments’ or ‘communes’). In the UK, the concept of ‘local au-
thority’ is almost all-embracing in that it includes both smaller (such as, 
the borough councils) and larger authorities, such as the combined au-
thorities (e.g., Greater London Authority, Greater Manchester and Liver-
pool City Region). Furthermore, the concept of ‘region’ might lead to spec-
ulations, in that a Spanish Autonomous Community is significantly differ-
ent from a French Region or a Belgian Community. The only reliable dis-
tinction in this field is probably between regions with and without legisla-
tive powers. However, also the legislative powers of the regions vary in 
the various Member States (cross-state asymmetry) and the constitutional 
standing of these regions varies accordingly. Whenever required by the 
rigour of this study, it will be clarified whether a conclusion applies to all 
sub-national authorities or only to some. Therefore, the approach chosen 
by this study to include in the analysis the ‘local and regional authorities’ 
will simplify the analysis without sacrificing its methodological rigour.  
So far, the notion of MLG has been primarily employed by legal scholars 
in a descriptive manner, as a tool to illustrate the multi-layered nature of 
the EU, or as a paradigm to understand EU decision-making (for example, 
recently, Popelier et al. 2013; Cygan 2013 and 2014; previously, Bernard 
2002 and Dubos 2012). Some recent legal studies explore MLG from a 
legal perspective and more specifically attempt to evaluate the impact of 
MLG on constitutionalism in the EU (Popelier and Vandenbruwaene 2014; 
Panara 2015: 155-174), or construe MLG as a sui generis system of gov-
ernance unique to the EU, which is different from federalism (Vandenbru-
waene 2014: 235-237; Panara 2015: 166-168; contra see Schütze 2009a, 
and Stein and Turkewitsch 2008). 
Panara (2015) and Simonato (2016) investigated the nature of MLG as a 
legal principle. Panara (2015: 73-74) suggests that MLG is a ‘procedural 
principle’, in that it commands a ‘method of governance’ based on “partic-
ipation and involvement of sub-national authorities in EU lawmaking and 
policymaking” (ibid. 73). Simonato (2016: 221-223) construes MLG as a 
principle of coordination of the action of governmental actors at various 
levels within the EU. As a ‘descriptive principle’ with an ‘heuristic function’ 
(Simonato 2016: 222), or as a ‘procedural principle’ (Panara 2015: 73), 
the judicial enforcement of MLG is seen by these scholars as problematic. 
A number of aspects relating to MLG, however, require further study from 
a legal perspective. The legal bases of MLG still need to be persuasively 
identified in the EU primary law and in the constitutional laws of the Mem-
ber States; the nature of MLG as a legal principle in the context of the EU 
demands more compelling corroborating evidence; the normative content 
of the principle of MLG needs accurate definition; the practical legal con-
sequences of the principle still need to be clearly determined, particularly 
the application of MLG by Union and national judiciaries. 
I will look at these aspects from a legal perspective. Only through a legal 
analysis, that is, through the interpretation of the legal bases of MLG, it is 
possible to address these questions and particularly to determine the legal 
nature and the legal consequences of MLG in the multi-layered legal sys-
tem of the EU. By EU legal system I mean the ‘constitutional composite’ 
(Verfassungsverbund, Pernice 2010 and 2009) or, according to a different 
terminology, the ‘fusion’ (Wessels 1997) and the ‘amalgamation’ (Amal-
gamierung, Nettesheim 2012: 324) resulting from the coordination of the 
EU and the national legal systems. 
I will present MLG as a constitutional principle in the EU legal system and 
I will illustrate the consequences of this conclusion. My article is therefore 
a contribution to a better understanding of MLG in the EU, particularly as 
a legal concept. It aims to highlight dynamics and possible developments 
linked to the legal notion of MLG. The article begins with an introduction 
to the concept of MLG which distinguishes between descriptive and nor-
mative notions of MLG (2.). Then, it construes MLG as a legal notion and 
more specifically as a legal principle (3.), by identifying the legal basis of 
MLG in EU primary law (3.1.), in the constitutional laws of the Member 
States (3.2.) and in EU secondary law (3.3.). After that, the article evalu-
ates the role of Union (3.4.1.) and of domestic courts (3.4.2.) in enforcing 
aspects of MLG, including subsidiarity (3.5.), and analyses the soft law 
mechanisms reflecting MLG (3.6.). The final paragraph (4.) lays out the 
conclusions.      
 
2. Sketching out the background: 
The normative notion of MLG in the White Papers   
 
Concerns relating to Type 1 MLG are at the forefront particularly in the 
White Paper on European Governance of the Commission (2001) and in 
the White Paper on MLG of the Committee of the Regions (hereafter CoR, 
2009). As well as a notion describing the ‘multi-levelness’ of the EU, since 
the 2001 White Paper MLG became also a normative notion which goes 
beyond the mere illustration or explanation of the functioning of the EU 
and of the multiple political arenas within the EU. In the 2001 White Paper 
the Commission highlights the importance of communication between the 
sub-national authorities and the EU. To this purpose, the White Paper lays 
out recommendations with the fundamental objective to enhance the le-
gitimacy of EU decisions, but also to promote ‘good governance’ in the 
EU (10-11). 
Eight years later the CoR in the White Paper on MLG adopted a notion of 
MLG which is fundamentally ‘procedural’, as it lays out guidelines in rela-
tion to how decisions are to be made in the EU. MLG emerges therefore 
as a ‘method’ or an ‘approach’, the appropriate method or approach ac-
cording to the CoR, for bringing together and coordinating the action of 
the different levels of government in the EU multilevel system. More spe-
cifically, according to the CoR, MLG consists of two key elements: (i) the 
implementation of EU and national law and policy at regional and local 
level (‘translating European or national objectives into local or regional 
action’) and (ii) the involvement of local and regional authorities in EU law-
making and policymaking both at EU and at national level (‘integrating the 
objectives of local and regional authorities within the strategies of the Eu-
ropean Union [...] and encourage their participation in the coordination of 
European policy’) (6-7). The key objectives of the CoR are to enhance the 
‘democratic legitimacy’ of Union action and to promote ‘good governance’. 
I decided to use the CoR’s notion of MLG because it comes from an au-
thoritative, although not legally binding, source (a white paper of the CoR), 
but also because it constitutes the basis for recent developments, such as 
the political document entitled Charter for MLG in Europe (CoR, Resolu-
tion on the Charter for MLG in Europe, 106th plenary session, 2 and 3 
April 2014, RESOL-V-012). Also, this notion has the capacity for capturing 
the processes and dynamics of MLG both on the EU level and within the 
domestic sphere. In the light of this notion MLG can embrace a number of 
arrangements, such as, in particular: (i) on the domestic level: A) proce-
dures for regional and/or local involvement in the EU lawmaking and pol-
icymaking; B) procedures to ensure compliance with EU obligations (e.g., 
substitute powers of the central government in case of lack of implemen-
tation of EU law by a regional authority); and C) involvement of regional 
parliaments with legislative powers in the early warning system (cf. Article 
6(1) Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality). (ii) On the EU level: A) 
opening up of the Council to regional representatives at ministerial level 
(cf. Article 16(2) TEU); B) involvement of the CoR, albeit only in a consul-
tative capacity, in the EU decision-making process; C) duty for the Com-
mission to consult widely when making legislative proposals and to take 
account of the regional and/or local dimension of the action envisaged (cf. 
Article 2 Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality); and D) early warn-
ing system, which involves also national chambers representing sub-na-
tional authorities (cf. Articles 6 and 7 Protocol on Subsidiarity and Propor-
tionality). 
The shift from a descriptive to a normative notion of MLG is highlighted 
also in the document of the CoR entitled Scoreboard for monitoring Multi-
level Governance (MLG) at the European level 2011 (December 2011): 
“Against this background, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) wants to 
strengthen MLG in the different strategic priorities of the EU and in the 
different stages of the decision-making process at European level. MLG 
thus acquires a new quality: from analytical tool, it becomes a principle 
and a programme for action. This demands very concretely the establish-
ment of structured political processes for monitoring and analysing gov-
ernance in the EU.” (p. 2). 
The Agenda 2020 of the Commission further emphasises the key norma-
tive role of local and regional authorities in delivering EU policy objectives, 
but also their contribution to the elaboration of the national reform pro-
grammes for the implementation of the EU strategy (6 and 29). However, 
the positive or negative impact of (Type 1) MLG is still the subject of de-
bate among scholars. Peters and Pierre (2004: 87), for example, identify 
a ‘Faustian bargain’ in the opaque negotiation of policy taking place 
among players from different levels within the EU. Similarly, De-
Bardeleben and Hurrelmann (2007: 240) argue that whilst MLG is likely to 
increase ‘output legitimacy’ (i.e., the problem-solving capacity of the EU), 
it is also likely to reduce ‘input legitimacy’ (i.e., essentially, democratic le-
gitimacy) because of increased difficulties in calling leaders to account. 
Moreover, whilst MLG in the EU may open up new spaces for participation 
and deliberation, it may also undermine the equal representation of all the 
citizens in the decision-making process. It has to be highlighted, however, 
that these scholars construe MLG essentially as negotiation of policy by 
the sub-national players on the EU level. Yet, the notion of MLG emerging 
from the CoR’s White Paper goes beyond the mere lobbying activity of the 
local and regional offices in Brussels and embraces the ‘official’ channels 
created at Member State, as well as at EU level (such as, in particular, the 
CoR). 
Other scholars give a more positive evaluation of MLG. Ingolf Pernice 
(2002: 11) highlights that constitutionalism in the EU (which he calls ‘mul-
tilevel constitutionalism’) requires the participation of local and regional 
authorities in the EU legislative process in order to compensate for the 
loss of autonomy resulting from the shift of powers to the European level, 
but also to provide European legislation with the necessary experience 
and knowledge from the ground. The participation he has in mind includes 
preliminary consultation with the local and regional authorities and partic-
ularly an important role of the CoR. The political scholar Simona Piattoni 
(2010: 178 et seqq.) argues that MLG contributes input and output legiti-
macy to the EU decision-making process and particularly that it contrib-
utes positively to democracy in the EU. In the same wavelength others 
suggest that local and regional participation in the EU contributes signifi-
cantly to constitutionalism and particularly to participatory democracy in 
the EU (European Parliament, resolution of 14 January 2003 on the role 
of regional and local authorities in European integration, 2002/2141(INI), 
Point 4; Mangiameli 2006: 460-462, 475-476, 480-481; Greenwood 2011: 
437 et seqq.; Panara 2016b: 622). 
 
3. The legal notion of MLG 
 
3.1. The constitutional foundation of MLG on the EU level  
 
The first element which is required in order to demonstrate that MLG is a 
legal principle is the identification of a solid legal basis for MLG in both the 
EU primary law (i.e., the constitutional charter of the EU) and in the con-
stitutional laws of the Member States. Why both? Because MLG envis-
ages a multi-level participation in EU decision-making processes which 
requires suitable arrangements and processes both on the EU and on the 
national level. Participation in EU decision-making processes is possible 
only if the European institutions open themselves up to such participation 
and engage with it. At the same time the involvement of the sub-national 
authorities in the implementation of EU policies is possible only if the 
Member States recognize the prerogatives of these authorities in the fields 
covered by the EU. This situation largely reflects the idea, put forward by 
Ingolf Pernice (2010: 102 et seqq.), that the EU is a ‘constitutional com-
posite’ (Verfassungsverbund) resulting from the national constitutions and 
the EU primary law. 
The constitutional foundation of MLG in the EU can be found in Article 
4(2) TEU. According to it, the Union shall respect the national identities of 
the Member States inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. Admittedly, 
it needs to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis that a certain ‘con-
stitutional structure’ reflects the ‘national identity’, and particularly that a 
certain MLG arrangement reflects that identity and therefore enjoys the 
protection of Article 4(2) TEU (Cloots 2015: 125 et seqq.). Yet, the consti-
tutional laws of some Member States (for example, Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK) strongly corroborate the claim 
that regional and local self-government are an integral part of their ‘con-
stitutional identity’, if not even of their ‘national identity’, with the result that 
repeal or limitation of these by force of EU or national law would not be 
legally feasible without a more fundamental change to the state constitu-
tion (Panara 2013: 373-376). 
But how can local and regional self-government be protected by the EU? 
Given the limited judicial enforceability of Article 4(2) TEU (cf. infra 3.4.1.), 
the most straightforward way for the EU institutions to enhance the role of 
the sub-national authorities is by promoting their participation in EU deci-
sion-making processes. This approach is mirrored by the Treaty provi-
sions concerning the advisory role of the CoR in the lawmaking process 
(cf. Article 13(4) TEU; Warleigh 1999; Ricci 2011: 110-111), by Article 
16(2) TEU concerning the opening up of the Council to regional represent-
atives ‘at ministerial level’, but also by Article 2 of the Protocol on Subsid-
iarity and Proportionality (duty for the Commission to consult widely before 
proposing legislation) and Article 6(1) of the same Protocol on the involve-
ment of regional parliaments with legislative powers in the delivery of rea-
soned opinions in the framework of the early warning system. This over-
view corroborates the conclusion that MLG, as defined by the 2009 White 
Paper, has a constitutional foundation on the EU level in the EU primary 
law. 
Despite the above highlighted roots of MLG in the EU primary law, and 
despite the fact that there is a constitutional framework for regional and 
local participation, the EU cannot oblige the Member States to create par-
ticipation channels for the sub-national authorities or to use those 
prompted by the Union. For example, participation in the Council is not 
only dependent on the EU, but especially on if and to what extent each 
Member State allows the sub-state entities to be involved in the Council. 
In accordance with the ‘united in diversity’ motto, the EU cannot impose 
uniform patterns to all the Member States. The EU can open its gates, but 
it is ultimately up to the Member States and their regions and local author-
ities to seize the opportunity. Therefore, the foundation of MLG cannot be 
in the EU primary law only.   
Furthermore, the guidance offered by EU primary law is rather minimal. 
Whilst the EU Treaties open up the Union’s processes to forms of sub-
national participation, there is little prescriptive indication on how these 
forms of participation should work in practice. For example, the decision 
on the composition of each (sub-)national delegation to the CoR is largely 
left to the Member States. It is up to each Member State to strike a balance 
in relation to the representation of the different levels of governance (re-
gional and/or local) within the CoR. Alone, the opportunities prompted by 
the EU primary law do not offer the whole picture of regional and local 
participation in the EU. MLG, far from being a monolithic notion finding 
application everywhere in the same way, is a largely asymmetrical con-
cept receiving differentiated application in each Member State. Accord-
ingly, there is no single pathway to MLG, but potentially twenty-eight dif-
ferent ones. 
The White Paper on MLG stresses that “The conditions for good multilevel 
governance depend on the Member States themselves. The principles 
and mechanisms of consultation, coordination, cooperation and evalua-
tion recommended at Community level must firstly be applied within the 
Member States.” (ibid. 7). The reflection paper emanating from the Co-
creation Workshop of 16 April 2012 concerning the European Charter on 
MLG put forward a number of recommendations to the Member States. 
These include: “stimulate regionalisation and decentralisation”, “coopera-
tion between national parliament and regional parliaments, notably on 
subsidiarity scrutiny”, “participation of RLA [regional and local authorities] 
into all stages of the EU policy cycle”, “further develop participation of RLA 
into the national delegation to the Council formal/informal meetings and 
comitology” (ibid. 4). 
 
3.2. The constitutional foundation of MLG on the national level  
 
At national level, the foundation of MLG is in the national constitutions of 
the Member States. All these constitutions protect regional and/or local 
autonomy and in a number of Member States local/regional autonomy is 
an element of the national identity as defined in Article 4(2) TEU (Cloots 
2015: 226). This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that all the Member 
States of the EU are also parties to the European Charter of Local Self-
Government promoted by the Council of Europe in 1985. This convention 
stipulates that the principle of local self-government shall be recognised, 
where practicable, in the national constitution (cf. Article 2). One of the 
key challenges for the Member States is therefore to ensure a sustainable 
balance between decentralisation to the sub-national authorities and su-
pranational integration, i.e. centralisation on the EU level. The Member 
States have developed strategies to reconcile local/regional autonomy 
with the growing role of the EU (cf. Panara and De Becker 2011; Popelier 
2014). These strategies are reflected in legal (often in constitutional) ar-
rangements and mirror perfectly the approach typical of MLG of promoting 
multi-level participation. 
A strategy to reconcile local/regional autonomy with the EU is the involve-
ment of regional and local authorities in the decision to transfer powers to 
the EU. The traditional and orthodox EU law perspective is that the Mem-
ber States are the sole ‘masters of the Treaties’. This appears confirmed 
by a reading of Article 48 TEU on the procedures for amending the Trea-
ties. However, the transfer of powers from the national level to the EU 
could undermine the role of the local and regional authorities and alter the 
constitutional balance of powers between central and sub-national gov-
ernments. This complexity of the EU multi-level system is addressed by 
certain Member States (in particular Belgium, Finland, Germany and Aus-
tria) through the involvement of the sub-national authorities in the deci-
sions concerning the European Treaties. For example, the Belgian Re-
gions and Communities have an important say on the transfer to the EU 
of their exclusive powers. A treaty concerning these powers is ratified by 
Belgium only if the parliaments of all the Regions and Communities con-
cerned consent to it. As a result, every sub-state parliament has a right of 
veto regarding the ratification of the treaty by Belgium (cf. De Becker 
2011: 256). In Germany, the Länder are involved collectively, as a level of 
government, in the approval of a treaty. An individual Land does not have 
a right of veto. Every new treaty would need to be approved by a two-third 
majority in the Bundesrat (the legislative chamber representing the Länder 
on the federal level), as well as in the Bundestag (democratically elected 
chamber representing the German people; Article 23(1) Basic Law). The 
German system is similar to the solution adopted in Austria, where 
amendments to the Treaties require a two-third majority both in the Na-
tionalrat (the chamber representing all the Austrian people) and in the 
Bundesrat (the chamber representing the Länder at federal level; Article 
50(1) No. 2 and 50(4) Federal Constitutional Law; Eberhard 2011: 219). 
In addition to their ex post involvement in the ratification of a new treaty, 
the Member States may also involve the sub-national authorities in the 
work of an intergovernmental conference (IGC) leading to a new treaty. 
The German Länder had two representatives in the German delegation to 
the IGC which led to the Maastricht Treaty. Their participation contributed 
to secure the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity, the establishment 
of the CoR and the opening up of the Council to regional ministers (cf. 
Gunlicks 2003: 366-67). This form of involvement is very important, since 
the opportunity to negotiate a new treaty could be more effective than the 
ex post approval (or threat of non-approval) of a treaty already negotiated 
and agreed by the national governments. 
Another strategy adopted by the Member States is the involvement of re-
gional and local authorities in the implementation of EU secondary and 
tertiary law and policy and in decision-making processes linked to the EU. 
This is envisaged in the White Paper on MLG of 2009. A number of Mem-
ber States have a framework in place for the involvement of their sub-
national authorities in the choice of the position of the Member State in 
EU decision-making fora (especially the Council) in relation to those policy 
issues touching upon sub-national responsibilities and interests (see Pa-
nara and De Becker 2011: 297 et seqq.; Eggermont 2011). This participa-
tion can take the form of an agreement between national government and 
sub-national authorities concerning the position of the Member State in 
the Council (Belgium, Spain), of a consultation of the sub-national author-
ities by the national government (Italy, Portugal, UK), or of more complex 
decision-making procedures taking place in the Bundesrat, the chamber 
representing the Länder (Austria and Germany; see, respectively, Eber-
hard 2011 and Panara 2011). 
This participation enables the sub-national authorities to maintain and 
possibly expand their constitutional role of protection of the sub-national 
interests, while being involved in supranational integration in the EU (Pa-
nara 2010: 82-83). It is apparent that local and regional participation in EU 
decision-making processes has a constitutional mission. It is constitution-
ally required by the Member States (at least by those the constitutional 
system of which includes regional and/or local self-government) and, to 
the extent to which quasi-federal arrangements in the domestic sphere 
reflect the ‘national identity’ of a Member State, also by EU primary law 
(cf. supra 3.1.). This is an example of how the EU and the national legal 
orders adjust mutually to each other in the context of the European legal 
system in conformity with the doctrine of European public law put forward 
by Patrick Birkinshaw (2014: 6 et seqq.) and to the idea, typical of consti-
tutional pluralism, that the EU and the national legal orders have to take 
into account as much as possible their respective constitutional require-
ments (cf. in particular Poiares Maduro 2012). 
 
3.3. EU secondary law 
 
As well as being rooted in EU primary law as a notion embracing poten-
tially all areas of action by the Union, MLG is also reflected in EU second-
ary law concerning specifically energy policy, as well as economic, social 
and territorial cohesion. Regulation (EU) No 1233/2010 on EU financial 
assistance to projects in the field of energy contains a significant reference 
to MLG. Point 3 of the Preamble establishes that MLG, defined as ‘coop-
eration among the various tiers of government’, is essential to the devel-
opment of further renewable energy sources and the promotion of energy 
efficiency. Regulation No 1233 also creates a dedicated financial facility 
in support of investment projects related to energy efficiency and renew-
able energy by local, regional and national public authorities (Point 4 of 
the Preamble and Annex II). The notion of MLG as ‘cooperation’ incorpo-
rates the idea of a coordinated action by various levels of governance for 
the achievement of European objectives, but also the idea that both the 
EU and the Member States shall respect the role of sub-national authori-
ties in relation to these objectives. For example, Regulation No 1233 es-
tablishes that the Union financial support shall facilitate investments in en-
ergy saving, energy efficiency and renewable energy projects from local, 
regional and, ‘in duly justified cases’, also national public authorities (cf. 
Annex II). Regulation No 1233 focuses therefore on the first dimension of 
MLG linked to translating European objectives into local and/or regional 
action. Through its financial intervention the EU wishes to enhance the 
role of regional and/or local authorities in relation to energy. 
The strongest reference to MLG can be found in Regulation (EU) No 
1303/2013 on EU funding promoting economic, social and territorial co-
hesion. This act expressly indicates MLG as a ‘principle’ that, along with 
subsidiarity and proportionality, must be ‘respected’ by the Member States 
when creating partnerships with the sub-national authorities and other 
economic and social actors for the implementation of the EU economic, 
social and territorial cohesion policy. Like in the CoR’s White Paper on 
MLG, also in Regulation No 1303 MLG emerges as a ‘procedural’ con-
cept, that is, as a method of governance which envisages the involvement 
of the sub-national authorities (“In accordance with the multi-level govern-
ance approach, the partners (...) shall be involved by the Member States 
in the preparation of Partnership Agreements and progress reports and 
throughout the preparation and implementation of programmes”, empha-
sis added, cf. Article 5(2)) and requires ‘coordinated action’ between the 
different levels of governance (“In order to respect [the] principles [of part-
nership and MLG] coordinated action is required, in particular between 
different levels of governance”, cf. Point 5.1 (1), Annex I). 
Regulation No 1303/2013 also contains indications concerning the raison 
d'être of MLG, where it says that respect for the principles of partnership 
and MLG is required “in order to facilitate achieving social, economic and 
territorial cohesion and delivery of the Union’s priorities of smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth” (Point 5.1 (1), Annex I). Accordingly, in the view 
of the EU legislator, the partnership with the sub-national authorities finds 
its justification in the need to enhance the effectiveness of the EU social 
and cohesion policy. Similarly, Regulation No 1303 also highlights that the 
ultimate purpose of a partnership in the context of the EU regional policy 
is “to ensure the ownership of planned interventions by stakeholders and 
build on the experience and the know-how of relevant actors” (Point 11 of 
the Preamble). The phrase ‘ownership by stakeholders’ suggests that the 
participation of sub-national authorities in the EU regional policy could 
contribute to the acceptance of these policies, i.e. to their legitimacy (‘own-
ership’), as well as to their effectiveness. 
The inclusion of MLG as a key principle of the EU regional policy sets 
aside any remaining doubts concerning the nature of MLG as a legal con-
cept. MLG clearly emerges as a principle of procedural nature (i.e. a prin-
ciple that requires a certain ‘method’ or ‘approach’), which must be re-
spected by the Member States in the field of economic, social and territo-
rial cohesion. In the context of this policy MLG is a ‘principle’ (Preamble 
to Regulation 1303/2013) established by Union law and, as such, its in-
terpretation could theoretically be referred to the Court of Justice via pre-
liminary references arising in domestic courts. Yet, the Court of Justice is 
likely to stick to a minimal and procedural notion of MLG. The EU can 
require the Member States to respect a certain ‘method’ or an ‘approach’ 
when implementing European policies, however it cannot impose a spe-
cific multilevel structure on them. The ‘method’ of MLG commands an ap-
propriate involvement of the sub-national authorities and of other relevant 
players in the preparation and execution of projects in the EU economic, 
social and cohesion policy. Far from laying out a set of prescriptive rules, 
MLG in this policy area emerges as a principle and more specifically as a 
‘procedural principle’ indicating in general how decisions shall be made 
and implemented. The added value of this method is an increased legiti-
macy and effectiveness of the EU regional policy. 
 
3.4. The role of the courts 
 
3.4.1. The Court of Justice of the EU 
 
The justiciability of a principle is not essential in order to conclude that that 
principle is a legal and not a philosophical or political notion. For example, 
the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity is very limited and contro-
versial, and yet that principle remains a constitutional cornerstone of the 
EU (Van Nuffel 2011: 78; Panara 2016a: 305 et seqq.). Similarly, judicial 
enforcement of various aspects of MLG does not need to be the primary 
route for ensuring compliance on the EU and on the national level (cf. 
Winter and May 2001: 675 et seqq.). Still, the traditional widely accepted 
notion of constitutionalism as a ‘legal limitation on government’ (McIlwain 
1947: 21; see also along the same lines Morbidelli 2010: 66; de Vergottini 
2007: 177 et seqq.) highlights that a legal limitation on power does not 
only require an adequate system of political rights and freedoms and of 
checks and balances in the political process. It also requires an important 
role of the judiciary in enforcing the legal limits to the exercise of political 
powers particularly through constitutional adjudication (cf. Matteucci 2010 
[1964]: 91; Nolte 2005: 16-18). In this and in the following section it will be 
shown how both Union and domestic courts have a role to play in enforc-
ing and shaping MLG. There are fundamentally three ways in which the 
judiciary of the Union can play a role: (i) in relation to the Treaty articles 
embodying the idea of MLG; (ii) in relation to the concept of ‘national iden-
tity’ of Article 4(2) TEU; and (iii) in relation to acts of secondary law which 
contain reference to and embody the concept of MLG.  
(i) In relation to those norms of EU primary law which embody or reflect 
MLG, Union courts can play the ordinary role they would play in relation 
to any other primary law rule. For example, the lack of consultation of the 
CoR, when this is compulsory, could lead to the annulment of the relevant 
act by the CJ. The CoR itself could request the annulment through a direct 
action pursuant to Article 263(3) TFEU. Admittedly, though, it is difficult to 
imagine a possible role for the CJ in relation to the regional participation 
in the Council (Article 16(2) TEU) and to the involvement of regional par-
liaments with legislative powers in the delivery of reasoned opinions in the 
framework of the early warning system (Article 6(2) Subsidiarity Protocol). 
The legal position is potentially different in relation to the duty for the Com-
mission to consult widely before drafting a legislative proposal (Article 2 
Subsidiarity Protocol). This is an important channel for political coopera-
tion and dialogue, which may help the Commission and the lawmaking 
institutions to focus on the potential impact of a regulation. It is unlikely 
that the CJ would uphold the claim that a certain act is unlawful for lack of 
or inadequate preliminary consultation. However, the Union judiciary has 
already expressly recognized that consultation contributes legitimacy to 
the EU lawmaking process. In the case UEAPME, the Court of First In-
stance (hereafter CFI) held that whenever the European Parliament does 
not participate in the enactment of a legislative act, the principle of democ-
racy requires an alternative form of participation by the people. If such 
participation takes the form of social dialogue, the Commission and the 
Council have an obligation to verify that the social partners involved are 
sufficiently representative. Only in this way the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU lawmaking process can be preserved (Case T-135/96, UEAPME 
v. Council [1998] ECR II-2335 para. 88–89; Smismans 2004: 340 et seqq.; 
Popelier 2011: 567; White Paper on European Governance 2001: 11). 
(ii) Article 4(2) TEU appears likely to lend itself to judicial enforcement in 
relation to MLG only in extreme circumstances. Probably, like for subsidi-
arity (cf. Panara 2016a: 321; contra Schütze 2009b and Vandenbruwaene 
2012 and 2013, who argue in favour of stricter judicial scrutiny of subsidi-
arity), only a clear abuse, such as an EU regulation on economic, social 
and cohesion policy ignoring completely the role of the sub-national au-
thorities, would find Union courts willing to annul it for a breach of Article 
4(2) TEU. An analysis of the jurisprudence of Union courts on Article 4(2) 
TEU in relation to regional and local autonomy offers important insights 
on MLG. 
As previously stated, the implementation of EU law and policy by the sub-
national authorities is a constitutive element of MLG as defined in the 2009 
White Paper of the CoR (cf. supra 2). This aspect came to the fore in a 
few cases concerning or surrounding Article 4(2) TEU: Commission v 
Spain (2013) and Digibet (2014). 
An interesting statement going into this direction can be found in the Opin-
ion that Advocate General Kokott delivered in the case Commission v 
Spain, concerning a failure by the Spanish Autonomous Communities to 
implement Directive 2000/60/EC on the water policy of the EU. In re-
sponse to the argument advanced by Spain, that a national regulation 
transposing the directive had already ensured full compliance with the EU 
rules, Kokott noted that this method of transposition (i.e. the subsidiary 
application of national rules) is probably in breach of the Spanish consti-
tutional law, because it does not acknowledge the legislative responsibility 
associated with the legislative power of the regional authorities. Through 
this argumentum ad adiuvandum AG Kokott implicitly recognised that the 
responsibility of the Autonomous Communities for the implementation of 
EU law in the areas falling within their legislative remit is an essential part 
of the constitutional identity of the Spanish State (Opinion of AG Kokott 
30 May 2013, Case C-151/12, Commission v Spain, para. 34-35). 
More recently, the CJ had an opportunity to clarify that “the division of 
competences between the [German] Länder cannot be called into ques-
tion, since it benefits from the protection conferred by Article 4(2) TEU” 
(cf. Case C-156/13, 12 June 2014, Digibet Ltd and Gert Albers v 
Westdeutsche Lotterie GmbH & Co. OHG, para. 34). Also, the Court reit-
erated the principle, already sketched out in the earlier case law (Joined 
Cases 51-54/71, 15 December 1971, International Fruit Company NV and 
others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit), that the EU cannot alter 
the allocation of responsibilities within the Member States (Case C-
156/13, Digibet, para. 33). The Opinion of AG Mengozzi in the case Re-
gioPost, reflected in the judgment of the Court in the same case, says in 
express terms that “it is clear from Article 4(2) TEU that EU law cannot 
prevent a regional or local entity from actually exercising the powers 
vested in it within the Member State concerned.” (para. 84 of the Opinion). 
Accordingly, the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate is entitled to pass legisla-
tion requiring the tenderers of a public procurement contract and their sub-
contractors to pay a minimum hourly wage to staff involved in the execu-
tion of the contract (cf. Opinion of AG Mengozzi 9 September 2015, Case 
C-115/14, RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau; Case C-115/14, 
17 November 2015, RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau). 
At the same time the Court has always consistently maintained that the 
internal allocation of competences within a Member State between cen-
tral, regional or local authorities, cannot in any way release that Member 
State from fulfilling its obligations under EU law (CJEU 8 September 2010, 
Case C-46/08, Carmen Media Group Ltd v Land Schleswig-Holstein, In-
nenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, para. 69; 13 September 
2001, Case C-417/99, Commission v Spain, para. 37; 28 February 1991, 
Case C-131/88, Commission v Germany, para. 71; 14 January 1988, 
Joined Cases 227-230/85, Commission v Belgium, para. 9). 
Admittedly, however, the expansive force of Article 4(2) TEU in relation to 
the role of the sub-national authorities seems to be limited (contra, it would 
appear, Cloots 2015: 226 et seqq.). The General Court dismissed the ar-
gument that the lack of recognition of locus standi to Northern Ireland goes 
against the obligation for the EU (stemming from Article 4(2) TEU) to re-
spect the national identity of the UK, including its regional self-govern-
ment. According to the Court “such an obligation does not in any way im-
pinge on the Treaty provisions on judicial remedies” (Case T-453/10, 6 
March 2012, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment v Commission, para. 36-38, the quote is from para. 38). This 
statement reflects the consolidated position of Union courts on the lack of 
privileged applicant status of the sub-national authorities in direct chal-
lenges under Article 263 TFEU (see, ex multis, ECJ 11 July 1984, Case 
222/83, Municipality of Differdange v Commission, para. 8; 21 March 
1997, Case C-95/97, Région Wallonne v Commission, para. 6-7; 1 Octo-
ber 1997, Case C-180/97, Regione Toscana v Commission, para. 7-8; 30 
April 1998, Case T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest v Commission, para. 28; see 
also Gamper 2013: 118-120; Thies 2011: 25; Dani 2004). This judicial po-
sition leaves a gap in the judicial protection of the rights of the sub-national 
authorities in the EU. This gap is not overcome by the judicial remedies 
available pursuant to Articles 267 and 277 TFEU (Panara and De Becker 
2011: 324). More effective ways to fill this gap have been developed at 
domestic level through the creation of tools enabling the sub-national au-
thorities, individually (like in Belgium) or collectively (like in Italy and Ger-
many), to oblige the national government to file an action for direct annul-
ment before Union courts pursuant to Article 263 TFEU (Panara and De 
Becker 2011: 326). 
(iii) As previously stated (cf. supra 3.3), the CJEU could be asked the cor-
rect interpretation of the concept of MLG through a preliminary reference, 
when this concept is used in the EU secondary law. To date, only Regu-
lation (EU) No 1233/2010 on renewable energy sources and Regulation 
(EU) No 1303/2013 on the EU economic, social and cohesion policy refer 
expressly to MLG. 
In summary, the legal nature of MLG is confirmed by the current and po-
tential role of the Court of Justice of the EU in relation to the enforcement 
of certain aspects of the notion of MLG: the participation in EU decision-
making processes; the implementation of EU law and policy; and, finally, 
the interpretation of the notion of MLG put forward by EU secondary law. 
 
3.4.2. The domestic courts 
 
Domestic courts, especially constitutional courts, can play a role in the 
enforcement of aspects of MLG at national level. More specifically, they 
can play a role: (i) by sanctioning a failure to comply with participatory 
arrangements established by national law; (ii) by preserving the right and 
duty of local and regional authorities to implement EU law and policy; and, 
finally, (iii) by contributing to the definition of important concepts, such as, 
‘national identity’, ‘fundamental structures, political and constitutional’, ‘re-
gional and local self-government’ (cf. Article 4(2) TEU). 
(i) If participatory arrangements established by domestic law are not ob-
served, the sub-national authorities in some Member States are theoreti-
cally entitled to instigate judicial proceedings in domestic courts to enforce 
their participation rights. This might be the case in Italy and Spain, where 
the rights of the sub-state authorities could be enforced in the constitu-
tional or administrative courts (cf. Panara and De Becker 2011: 315-317) 
and, with greater difficulty, in Austria (cf. Panara and De Becker 2011: 
316-317). This might be the case also in Germany. The constitutional par-
ticipatory rights of the German Länder through the Bundesrat are in prin-
ciple enforceable in the Federal Constitutional Court (see Article 93(1), 
No. 1 and No. 3, Basic Law). However, in 1995 the Court found that the 
Federal Government had not respected the rights of the Bundesrat in re-
lation to Directive 89/522/EEC on TV. The Court held that this behaviour 
was in breach of the principle of federal loyalty (cf. Ruling of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of 22 March 1995). However, this declaration did not 
result, nor could it, in the invalidity of the directive. Admittedly, the impos-
sibility to declare the invalidity of the final act could undermine the effec-
tiveness of the judicial intervention. This example suggests that, in case 
of non-compliance with participatory arrangements, the sanction for a na-
tional government might be political and concern the legitimacy of an ac-
tion, rather than legal and lead to the invalidity of an action. 
A first problem with the enforcement of the participation rights of the re-
gional authorities is therefore that, should a national court find that a do-
mestic law provision has not been complied with, that court would still not 
be entitled to declare the invalidity (or the inapplicability) of the EU meas-
ure. According to the ‘orthodox’ EU perspective, the invalidity of EU legis-
lation can be declared only by Union courts. A second problem is that it 
could take some time before a domestic court would pass a ruling on the 
judicial enforcement of regional participation rights. This would not neces-
sarily be compatible with the speed of EU decision-making processes. 
This situation surely limits the effectiveness of national provisions regulat-
ing sub-state entities’ participation rights. This explains why regional au-
thorities generally prefer to settle their disputes with the national govern-
ment politically, in conformity with the principle of loyal cooperation, rather 
than judicially (Panara and De Becker 2011: 318). 
(ii) The sub-national authorities have a primary responsibility for the im-
plementation of EU law and policy in those areas falling within their remit. 
This principle is explicitly (UK, Section 53 and Paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 
5 of the Scotland Act 1998, Paragraph 3(c) Schedule 2 of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, Section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006; Italy, 
Art. 117(5) of the Constitution) or implicitly (Germany, Belgium, Spain) en-
trenched in the constitutional systems of the Member States (Panara and 
De Becker 2011: 333-335). The constitutional courts can definitely play a 
role in ensuring that implementation of EU law and policy follows the in-
ternal allocation of responsibilities between national and sub-national au-
thorities. Even in the UK, where certain arrangements concerning devolu-
tion and MLG are ‘binding in honour only’, in the event of a disagreement 
between UK government and devolved administrations over whether a 
particular issue falls within a devolved competence or it is retained by 
Westminster, the dispute might be referred to the Supreme Court (cf. Par-
agraph B4.9 of the Concordat on the Co-ordination of EU Policy of Sep-
tember 2012). 
The rule that the implementation of EU law and policy shall follow the in-
ternal distribution of responsibilities admits only limited and justifiable ex-
ceptions, although the boundaries of these exceptions are uncertain and 
vary from state to state. The Italian Constitutional Court (Ruling No. 126 
of 24 April 1996) stated that an alteration of the normal distribution of com-
petences between State and Regions may exceptionally be accepted if 
the proper implementation of an EU regulation required the adoption of 
uniform rules across the entire national territory. In the Ruling of 14 Octo-
ber 2008 concerning EC Regulation No 1782/2003, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that the proper im-
plementation of the Regulation required a federal statute in order to safe-
guard the legal and economic unity of the country (para. 88-89).  
The Austrian Constitutional Court created the interesting notion of dop-
pelte Bindung (double bond). The domestic legislator is indeed ‘bound 
twice’. On the one hand, it has to comply with EU obligations and, on the 
other, with the national constitution, including the distribution of responsi-
bilities between Federation (Bund) and Länder. The Länder have the con-
stitutional right and, at the same time, the duty, to implement EU law and 
policy within their sphere of responsibility and territory. If in a matter within 
the remit of the Länder an EU act required uniform implementation within 
the national territory, it would be necessary to amend the constitution 
(Austrian Constitutional Court 14.863/1997 and 17.022/2003). However, 
if, pursuant to Article 258 TFEU, the Court of Justice found that an Aus-
trian Land failed to comply with an obligation under EU law, the responsi-
bility to adopt the necessary measures would pass temporarily to the Fed-
eration (‘substitute power’, cf. Art. 23d, paragraph 5, final sentence, B-VG; 
cf. Eberhard 2011: 229-230). 
Substitute state powers as a tool for the implementation of EU law and 
policy are also in place in other Member States, such as Italy, Spain and 
Belgium (cf. Panara and De Becker 2011: 336-340). The constitutional 
distribution of powers between central government and regional level 
could be seriously undermined if substitute powers were exercisable a 
priori, i.e., before the non-fulfilment of an EU obligation and in order to 
prevent it from occurring. The Spanish Constitutional Court envisaged that 
a substitute power can be exercised only after the non-fulfilment of an EU 
obligation by a region has taken place (cf. Spanish Constitutional Court 
Ruling No. 80 of 8 March 1993). Such a clear stance, however, has not 
been taken by the constitutional courts in other Member States, such as 
Italy, where a priori substitution is the rule, even though the regional au-
thorities can replace the implementing measures issued by the central 
government with their own (cf. Villamena 2011: 175).    
(iii) The concept of ‘national identity’ (and those of ‘fundamental struc-
tures, political and constitutional’ and ‘regional and local self-government’ 
of Article 4(2) TEU) is a notion of EU law and, as such, its content shall 
be further specified by the CJEU. However, the specific content of the 
‘national identity’ is likely to result also from the understanding of the own 
identity by each Member State. Accordingly, the CJEU might have to rely 
also on the national law and particularly on the case-law of the constitu-
tional courts (von Bogdandy and Schill 2010: 8; Streinz 2012: 28; see also 
the Ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ratification 
of Treaty of Lisbon of 30 June 2009).  
In summary, again, the legal nature of MLG is confirmed by the role of the 
domestic courts in particular in relation to: (i) ensuring that the national 
authorities comply with participatory arrangements established by na-
tional law and linked to MLG, even though in practice the effectiveness of 
these remedies is limited; (ii) protecting the right (and duty) of local and 
regional authorities to implement EU law and policy within their remit, alt-
hough this right of the regional authorities has occasionally been restricted 
by the courts (for example, in Italy and in Germany) and through the cre-
ation of state substitute powers; and, finally, (iii) in relation to the potential 
contribution of domestic courts to the specification of the content of Article 
4(2) TEU from a national perspective. 
 
3.5. MLG and subsidiarity 
 
Another issue closely related to MLG is subsidiarity. Pursuant to Article 
5(3) TEU, “the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level”. According to some 
scholars, subsidiarity is a political or philosophical concept and, as such, 
its judicial enforcement is impossible or extremely difficult (Working Group 
I 2002: 2; Barber 2005a; Toth 1994: 282). The Court of Justice of the EU 
seems to perceive this principle as a ‘threat to integration’ (Estella 2002: 
178), as ‘totally alien’ to the EU (Toth 1992: 1079) and in conflict with the 
‘broad ethos’ of the Court (Barber 2005b: 199). The constitutional rele-
vance of this problem is high, because it is linked to the general problem 
of constitutionalism as a legal limitation to political power (McIlwain 1958 
[1947]: 21), which in turn presupposes the judicial review of the action of 
public authorities (Matteucci 2010 [1964]: 91; Barberis 2012: 20-21). 
Van Nuffel (2011: 65-66) criticises the opinion depicting the Court of Jus-
tice as “consistently unwilling to review Community legislation for alleged 
violations of subsidiarity” (Cooper 2006: 284). Even though it is a hard fact 
that in no single case landed before the Court of Justice the outcome has 
been the annulment of an act for a breach of subsidiarity, analyses of the 
cases concerning subsidiarity highlight that the Court does not uphold EU 
action without appropriate scrutiny (Van Nuffel 2011: 65-66; Craig 2012: 
80; Panara 2016a: 319; contra Vandenbruwaene 2013: 159). According 
to these analyses the circumstance that until now no act of the Union has 
been annulled for a breach of that principle is essentially due to the limited 
number of cases in which subsidiarity pleas have been brought before the 
Court (Craig 2012: 80) and to the fact that in all cases there were persua-
sive justifications for the action of the Union (cf. Van Nuffel 2011: 65-66; 
see, inter alia, Case C-84/94, UK v Council [1996] ECR I-5755; Case C-
377/98, Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-
7079; Case C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health (ex parte 
British American Tobacco Ltd.) [2002] ECR I-11453; Joined Cases C-
154/04 and C-155/04, ANH v Secretary of State for Health [2002] ECR I-
6451; Case C-103/01, Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I-5369; Case 
C-58/08, The Queen v Secretary of State for Business (ex parte Voda-
fone) [2010] ECR I-4999; Case C-508/13, Estonia v European Parliament 
and Council, EU:C:2015:403; Case T-257/13, Poland v Commission, 
EU:T:2015:111; Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and 
Council, EU:C:2016:323). 
In no circumstance the Court came to a conclusion in relation to subsidi-
arity different from that advised by an Advocate General (AG). Whilst ad-
mittedly some Advocates General’s opinions entail a surface scrutiny of 
subsidiarity (see, for example, AG Geelhoed Opinion in Joined Cases C-
154/04 and C-155/04 ANH v Secretary of State for Health), others have 
been quite thorough when tackling the same issue (cf. AG Poiares Ma-
duro, Opinion in Case C-58/08, The Queen v Secretary of State for Busi-
ness (ex parte Vodafone); AG Jääskinen, Opinion in Case C-507/13, UK 
v European Parliament and Council [para. 101 et seqq.]; AG Kokott, Opin-
ion in Case C-358/14, Poland v European Parliament and Council; AG 
Léger Opinion in Case C-84/94, UK v Council [Working Time Directive]). 
It is difficult to picture how the Court of Justice could give more substance 
to the rights of the regional and local authorities through subsidiarity. None 
of the cases on subsidiarity has ever concerned directly regions or local 
authorities within the Member States and the protection for regional and 
local authorities in Article 5(3) TEU has so far remained on paper (cf. Van 
Nuffel 2011: 61). MLG envisages participation by sub-national authorities 
in EU decision-making processes (cf. 2 supra and CoR White Paper MLG 
2009). So, whilst subsidiarity is judicially enforceable in extreme circum-
stances of clear abuses, MLG pushes towards multi-level cooperation or 
procedural mechanisms alternative to judicial enforcement in order to en-
sure compliance with subsidiarity (Panara 2015: 121-122). 
The most important procedural innovation introduced by the Lisbon Subsid-
iarity Protocol is certainly the ‘early warning system’ (Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Protocol), a mechanism aiming to create a dialogue between national par-
liaments and Union institutions during the legislative process. Whilst it is not 
easy to reach the minimum number of votes for triggering a ‘yellow’ or an 
‘orange card’ (so far only two yellow cards have been issued), the early 
warning system is potentially important for regional participation in EU de-
cision-making processes in that national parliaments shall consult with re-
gional parliaments with legislative powers (Article 6(1) Lisbon Subsidiarity 
Protocol). In theory, the early warning system could also modify the tradi-
tional self-restraint of the Court of Justice in relation to subsidiarity. The 
evidence contained in the reasoned opinions of the national parliaments 
and of the Commission could be taken into account by the Court of Justice 
when addressing a subsidiarity complaint. Additionally, the procedural re-
quirements of the early warning system seem to be judicially enforceable 
and failure to comply with these could lead to the invalidation of an act by 
the Court. In this way, however, the Court would be enforcing certain pro-
cedural requirements rather than subsidiarity per se (Panara 2016a: 327-
328). 
A similar tendency towards ‘proceduralisation’ can be seen in the role of 
the CoR in relation to subsidiarity. When performing its consultative role, 
the CoR will normally express its point of view on the conformity of a leg-
islative proposal with subsidiarity (cf. Article 55(2) CoR’s Rules of Proce-
dure; Ricci 2011: 123-126). The Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol gave the 
CoR the right to challenge a legislative act on grounds of infringement of 
subsidiarity (Article 8(2) Protocol). Despite that, the CoR does not appear 
particularly confident that subsidiarity can be enforced through judicial re-
view. Until now no challenge has been lodged by the CoR against an act 
for an infringement of subsidiarity. Admittedly, it cannot be excluded that 
the right to challenge, albeit not yet exercised, may have strengthened the 
opinions of the CoR vis-à-vis the lawmaking institutions. For this reason, 
the CoR may be playing a stronger role in the legislative process, in which 
case compliance with subsidiarity would stem from multi-level dialogue 
and cooperation between political actors rather than from judicial scrutiny. 
The procedural requirement for the Commission to consult the CoR (albeit 
not only in relation to subsidiarity) on proposals in certain policy areas, is 
judicially enforceable. Pursuant to Article 263(3) TFEU the CoR has the 
status of a privileged applicant when challenging an act to protect its con-
stitutional prerogatives. Like in the early warning system, however, there 
would be a shift of focus of the judicial review from subsidiarity per se to 
the enforcement of certain procedural requirements linked to subsidiarity. 
This is why Nettesheim (2014) labels subsidiarity as ‘politisches Recht’ 
(political law), an oxymoronic notion indicating those legal provisions 
which are only or principally enforceable through forms of political coordi-
nation. 
 
3.6. Soft law mechanisms 
 
Alongside the hard law mechanisms illustrated previously (cf. supra 3.1., 
3.2. and 3.3.), there are soft law instruments at EU level which promote 
multi-level participation of the sub-national authorities in the EU. A tool 
prompted by the Commission in the wake of the 2001 White Paper is the 
Structured Dialogue created by a Commission’s communication (Commu-
nication from the Commission COM (2003) 811 final of 19 December 
2003) and by a decision of the CoR (see CoR’s Bureau Decision CoR 
380/2003, part II, of 19 March 2004). The Structured Dialogue consists in 
meetings between representatives of the Commission and selected Euro-
pean and national associations of sub-national authorities. These associ-
ations are identified by the Commission upon advice from the CoR. The 
meetings of the Structured Dialogue may concern the annual work pro-
gramme of the Commission (‘general dialogue’) or a particular policy area 
(‘thematic dialogue’; in the literature cf. Vara Arribas 2005: 19 et seqq.; 
Domenichelli 2007: 71 et seqq.; Ricci 2011: 122). 
In 2006 the European Commission launched the Political Dialogue with 
national parliaments (Communication to the European Council, A Citi-
zens’ Agenda, Brussels, 10 May 2006, COM (2006) 211 final, p. 9). Due 
to the flexible nature of the political dialogue compared, for example, to 
the early warning system (the political dialogue is not limited to subsidiarity 
in relation to legislative acts, nor is it bound by rigid deadlines), national 
parliaments or chambers thereof (including those houses representing re-
gional authorities, such as, in particular, the German Bundesrat), use this 
tool more frequently than the early warning system. In 2014, 506 opinions 
were issued by national parliaments, but only 21 of those were reasoned 
opinions issued in the context of the early warning system (Commission 
2014: Annex 1). In 2015, 350 parliaments’ opinions were issued, but only 
6 of those in the context of the early warning system (Commission 2015: 
Annex 1).  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The previous legal analysis of MLG suggests that MLG, as defined in the 
White Paper of 2009, is a legal, as well as a normative notion. The nature, 
scope and sphere of application of MLG go significantly beyond the tradi-
tional descriptive notion of MLG of the early days (cf. Marks 1992; Hooghe 
and Marks 2001). MLG has a constitutional foundation both on the EU and 
on the national level. The fundamental idea of MLG is rooted in legal ar-
rangements both at EU and national level, as well as in hard and in soft 
law mechanisms. MLG envisages participatory solutions to the constitu-
tional problems linked to the position of the local and regional authorities 
in EU integration. 
MLG is normatively linked to the principles of local and regional autonomy 
and of subsidiarity. It operationalises them in the multi-level context of the 
EU by envisaging participation by local and regional authorities in EU de-
cision-making processes and in the implementation of EU law and policy. 
MLG has the characteristics of a legal concept and, more specifically, of 
a legal principle. It is sufficiently ‘general’ and ‘fundamental’ to be a prin-
ciple, but at the same it is sufficiently prescriptive to indicate a way forward 
in terms of the future direction and development of the EU. It can be clas-
sified as a ‘procedural’ principle which focuses on how decision-making 
processes shall be structured within the EU and on who has to participate 
in these processes. It can also be indicated as an ‘accessory’ principle in 
that it is functional to the normative values embodied in local and regional 
autonomy and in subsidiarity (cf. Panara 2016a: 305-306). 
This study identified four functions of MLG as a legal notion in the EU. 
(1) Epistemological function concerning the nature of the EU. 
Quite rightly, Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe argue that federalism is the 
intellectual foundation of Type 1 MLG (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 17). The 
EU, like federal or regional states, is a multi-level system (cf. Benz 2009). 
These systems feature a plurality of mutually interacting layers of govern-
ance and, despite significant differences between themselves, belong to 
the same fundamental family, the ‘federations’ (Schütze 2012: 77-79). The 
legal notion of MLG adds to this background a constitutional traction to-
wards multi-level cooperation in relation to the shaping and implementa-
tion of EU laws and policies. It envisages a strong cooperative philosophy 
for the EU, which is remindful of cooperative federalism, based on partic-
ipation by the sub-national authorities in the decision-making processes 
of the central authority, as opposed to the rigid separation of the spheres 
of responsibility typical of dual federalism (on ‘dual’ and ‘cooperative fed-
eralism’ cf. Reposo 2005; Bognetti 1994; de Vergottini 1990). 
(2) De iure condendo function. 
As a bi-dimensional (both national and EU) constitutional principle, MLG 
pushes towards a certain development of the EU as a multi-level system. 
It is a principle remindful of the ‘programmatic rules’ of some national con-
stitutions (cf. Crisafulli 1952). These rules lay out objectives for the legis-
lator in various areas, from economy to education or healthcare. MLG is 
similar to these ‘rules’ in that it lays out a ‘plan of action’ concerning how 
the EU and its Member States have to structure the relationship between 
layers of governance within the EU. As previously stated, the mutual con-
vergence of the EU and its Member States towards MLG reflects the idea, 
typical of constitutional pluralism, that the EU and the national legal orders 
shall take into account as much as possible their respective constitutional 
requirements (Poiares Maduro 2012). A Treaty amendment which would 
go into the fundamental the direction of MLG would be, for example, the 
extension of the eight-weeks period for the release of a reasoned opinion. 
This would enhance regional participation in the early warning system and 
promote compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.   
(3) Behaviour-shaping function. 
Since it is normatively linked to local/regional autonomy and subsidiarity, 
MLG as a procedural principle on how to make decisions in the EU, shall 
guide the behaviour of actors in the EU political arena. The Commission, 
for example, shall consult ‘widely’ before proposing legislation (Article 2 
Subsidiarity Protocol) and the consultation shall include local and regional 
actors. Where appropriate, the proposed legislation shall create participa-
tion mechanisms for these actors (see, for example, the ‘partnerships’ with 
local and regional authorities envisaged by EU Regulation No 1303/2013). 
Compliance with subsidiarity in particular can be enhanced through mech-
anisms of multi-level cooperation and dialogue, such as the structured and 
especially the political dialogue, and lead to legislation more respectful of 
the autonomy of sub-national authorities and Member States. On the other 
end of the spectrum, as well as the EU and the Member States, also the 
local and regional actors shall actively engage with the EU and utilize the 
participation opportunities prompted by the EU.   
(4) Interpretation-shaping function. 
MLG as a legal principle shall also guide the interpretation and application 
of the law by the courts and particularly the Court of Justice of the EU in 
relation to: subsidiarity, enforcement of the participation rights of local and 
regional authorities, locus standi of local and regional authorities in direct 
challenges to EU acts in Union courts. In relation to subsidiarity the appli-
cation of MLG should lead not only or necessarily to a stricter judicial scru-
tiny of Article 5(3) TEU. It should rather ensure compliance with subsidi-
arity ex ante, during the lawmaking process, through multi-level dialogue 
and cooperation (for example, through consultation of the CoR or the early 
warning system) and the enforcement of these procedural requirements 
by the Court of Justice. 
As to the participation rights of the sub-state authorities, the ‘orthodox’ EU 
law position of in principle indifference to the decision-making processes 
internal to the Member States, would lead the Court of Justice to ignore 
any infringements of these rights by the Member States. This position re-
flects a residual ‘regional blindness’ of the EU, i.e. its traditional tendency 
(until the 1990s) to ignore completely the sub-national authorities (on the 
concept of ‘regional blindness’, ‘Landesblindheit’, see Ipsen 1966). This 
disadvantage for the regions could be addressed by the Court of Justice, 
if it chose to consider unlawful EU acts for a breach of national rules con-
cerning regional participation. The judicial enforcement of the participation 
rights of the regions could find its legal basis, as well as in the principle of 
MLG, also in the protection of the ‘national identity’ pursuant to Article 4(2) 
TEU, or in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (cf. Article 
46). However, it would need to be demonstrated in each case that an in-
fringement of regional participation amounts, respectively, to a violation of 
the ‘national identity’ or to a manifest violation of a rule of internal law of 
fundamental importance. 
Finally, MLG could mitigate the consolidated position of the Court of Jus-
tice on the locus standi of local and regional authorities and establish an 
interpretation of Article 263(3) TFEU which would make it easier for local 
and regional authorities to challenge the validity of acts which impact det-
rimentally on their responsibilities and interests (cf. AG Jacobs, Opinion 
in Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, para. 102, 
although not specifically in relation to sub-national authorities). 
In summary, the legal analysis identifies a compelling legal basis for MLG. 
This in turn becomes a more stable concept with a constitutional founda-
tion and less exposed to political dispute. The legal analysis also identifies 
the potential of MLG for the interpretation of EU law and for shaping future 
developments within the EU legal system.  
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